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IntroductIon
Over the past few decades substantial progress has been achieved in the de-
mocratisation and modernisation of the countries of Southeastern Europe. 
The formal democratic institutions were introduced, a liberalisation of trade 
resulted in the reintegration of the region into the global economy and some 
of them successfully applied to join the EU and NATO. But the transformation 
process is far from over and this became more evident with the outbreak of the 
global crisis and the changing international environment.
The countries in the region, despite all the internal differences and various 
degrees of integration with the EU and NATO share common challenges. The 
mere fact of applying for accession to the EU or even EU membership has not 
yet resulted in the full consolidation of democratic systems in those coun-
tries. Moreover their economies are catching up more slowly than many had 
hoped. These problems are to some extent connected with the crisis within 
the EU, which undermined the principle of solidarity and enhanced the focus 
on national interests. This makes the EU less interested in integration and en-
largement as an engine for democratisation and economic modernisation. The 
whole region became, as Dimitar Bechev put it, “the periphery of the periph-
ery”, far away from the core of EU integration and the interest of Brussels. This 
term refers not only to the Western Balkans countries but also to other coun-
tries in the region including those which despite being EU members have no 
influence on its policy although their prosperity and prospects are highly de-
pendent on it. These negative trends affected standards of democracy and the 
market economy. In the past years the achievements of the political and eco-
nomic transformation have been rolled back and the quality of governance has 
declined in many countries. To avoid a further deterioration of the situation in 
the region the new impulse for institutional transformation and a change of 
the development model are needed.
A post transformation grey zone emerged in the region with the political system 
swinging between soft authoritarianism and powerless democracy. The weak 
rule of law and endemic corruption are also among the biggest challenges. The 
apathetic civil societies and media controlled by political elite do not perform 
watchdog functions over the action of the states. Although widespread dissat-
isfaction and disappointment in some countries led to massive protest only in 
Slovenia and Greece, they caused a change of the political elite. But even in 
these two cases the new parties were based on populist sentiments and did not 
bring a new wave of reform. The polarisation of society, the monopolisation of 
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power and also using nationalist sentiments are the common practices which 
the political elite uses to stay in power and influence the quality of democracy. 
Moreover the ruling parties use their position to weaken the institutional sys-
tem of checks and balance to consolidate their control over the society.
Democratic institutions have proven particularly vulnerable in the face of 
a deep economic crisis. The governments in the region have strengthened 
their influence on the media which have become dependent on advertising 
revenue from administration and public companies. A huge public sector com-
bined with high unemployment is a powerful tool for building party-political 
patronage and clientelist dependencies. That makes the alternation of power 
even less possible and what is more important deprives citizens of the ability to 
hold their political leaders accountable for their actions. These tendencies con-
tributed to decreasing trust in liberal democracy in whole region. The weak 
prospect of economic growth and thus the development of a strong private sec-
tor leave little hope for a change in the relations between the political elites and 
societies.
The economic prospects of Southeast Europe are dependent on the situation of 
the euro zone and the rest of the EU as main trade partner and source of FDI. 
The global crisis which affected the EU undermined the development model of 
the region based on the influx of FDI, loans and remittances. In times of cri-
sis, it became more evident that the lack of an investor friendly environment, 
proper infrastructure, a state-dominated economy and an oligarchic political 
system were the main obstacles for quick economic growth. Economic hard-
ship did not bring about a new wave of reform in order to make region more 
competitive. On the contrary, in many countries the achievements of the trans-
formation were reversed. Instead of privatisation the state has played a more 
important role in the economy and politicians have gained more influence on 
a once independent institution of free market. The poor societies in the region 
oppose any austerity programmes and the governing elite prefer to buy time 
by increasing the national debt.
Nor is there any drive for reform coming from outside. The EU used to be con-
sidered as the best anchor to support democratic transformation in the region 
and the accession process and put pressure on the local elite to carry out re-
forms, but in the long run the everyday custom proved to be more important 
than adopted laws and procedures. Lack of proper implementation hampered 
democratic consolidation but the EU preoccupied with internal problems and 
has not monitored the situation in the region. Moreover at present the EU has 
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no instrument to subordinate the political elite in those countries, which are 
already EU members. In turn, for the governments of those states outside the 
EU, the prospects of accession are not tangible enough to convince them to fol-
low the rules of democracy.
The fragile democracies in the region left in limbo are more vulnerable to the 
influence of other international players like Russia, China or Turkey. In this 
perspective especially, the growing engagement of Russia in Southeast Europe, 
which has been observed since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, is worri-
some. Russia approaches this part of Europe as an arena of proxy geopolitical 
rivalry with the West and its activity there undermines the transformative 
agenda of the EU in two aspects. First of all the way Russia is building influence 
in the region enhance the shortcomings of the Southeast Europe countries – 
clientelism, corruption and state capture. Secondly by promoting a vision of 
the successful and prosperous “illiberal democratic system” of Russia and un-
derlining the failures and problems of EU members challenges the necessity 
of implementing reform required by Brussels. In the long time perspective for 
the countries in the region there is no other solution but the EU, but in the im-
mediate future Russia’s activity can hamper the EU’s efforts to transform and 
stabilise the region.
In these circumstances Poland’s greater involvement in support of the reform 
process in Southeastern Europe could be mutually beneficial. Poland, aspir-
ing to become one of the key players in the EU, by enhanced cooperation with 
the region would strengthen its position within the EU. The successful trans-
formation of those countries is one of key challenges not only for Poland but 
also for its partners in the V4 as it guarantees security and stability in their 
neighbourhood. Moreover the good examples from this region can be used in 
the policy towards its Eastern partners to convince them to implement reform. 
What is more, the international position of Poland depends on the success of 
the EU as a global player. Thus completing the transformation will be proof of 
the EU’s ability to stabilise and influence the situation in its own backyard and 
thus its international position vis-a-vis the USA or Russia.
Promoting the Polish example of a successful transformation could enhance 
support for the reform and EU accession because EU members in the region do 
not perceive their membership as a success story which has brought economic 
prosperity and high democratic standards. Poland can serve as proof that EU 
membership provides significant, tangible benefits although they are not au-
tomatic. The exchange of Polish know-how can in many cases be more useful 
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as its transformation pattern is similar. Thus Poland can provide a practical 
solution for the concrete problems. Poland’s positive experience can also sup-
port further enlargement within the EU as the country became an important 
political and economic player due to its membership. The more vocal support 
for enlargement policy should not mean a withdrawal from the strict criteria 
for membership but rather more visible benefits for introducing – and what 
is even more important – implementing the reforms. As current experience 
shows, the EU is important in setting the reform agenda but quality of imple-
mentation depends on the ability of society to control the government. Thus 
more support for creating a vibrant civil society and independent media is of 
crucial importance.
This report is the outcome of a discussion held during the conference “The Free - 
dom Challenge in Southeastern Europe – Implications for Poland”. This joint 
event was developed by the Centre for Eastern Studies and Ideas Lab – the Presi-
dent’s Expert Programme at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of 
Poland. The aim of the conference was to exchange opinions about the transfor-
mation of the countries in the region and Poland with experts from the South-
eastern Europe and representatives of the Polish administration, academia and 
think tanks. The chapters of the report reflect the main three subjects debated 
during the conference. In the first chapter Spasimir Domaradzki assesses the 
rule of law and its influence on the consolidation of democracy in the region. 
In the second chapter Marta Szpala focuses on economic development in South-
eastern Europe and its links with the state of democracy. The third chapter is 
written by Adam Balcer and analyses the key instruments Russia is using to 
build influence in this region and assesses its leverage.
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MaIn poInts
1. Regardless of the level of interaction with the EU, the countries from South-
eastern Europe present a very similar level of rule of law and human rights 
protection. The prevailing perception of political life in the region recog-
nises the corrupt nature of politicians, directly linked with organised crime 
groups and oligarchs, and focused only on complete control of the economy. 
The wave of protests that has been making its way through the countries of 
the region since 2012 exemplifies the popular frustration and dissatisfaction 
with the political elites and existing economic and social reality.
2. In order to secure a future smooth enlargement towards the Western Bal-
kans, the EU should emphasise the explicit rule of law and human rights 
criteria that should constitute a sine qua non condition for membership. 
The 2007 and 2013 EU members should be targeted with substantial sup-
port for civil society and constructive criticism towards the political elites, 
pressure should be applied in favour of the introduction of genuine self-
government, and there should be periodical changes in the political elites 
and a reform of the judiciary.
3. The transformation brought about a reintegration of Southeastern coun-
tries into the global economy and an improvement in living standards. But 
fast economic growth to 2008 led to the false impression that they would 
quickly catch up with the rest of the European Union without the need for 
reform. The global economic crisis exposed the weakness of the growth 
model which was being pursued by many countries in the region based 
on FDI and loans with a lack of productive investment. In consequence of 
this the process of catching-up with the advanced economies is slower in 
Southeastern Europe. Unless a new wave of reforms to enhance the com-
petitiveness of local economies is introduced, the region risks stagnation 
in the long-term.
4. The deteriorating economic situation caused by the global crisis has had 
wider consequences for the quality of democracy. The high unemployment, 
underdeveloped private sector, the huge influence of the political elite on 
the economy enhance clientelism, corruption and state capture. At the 
same time civil society and the independent media have been significantly 
weakened. Current situation make the political elites less keen on imple-
menting reforms as they prefer to resort to undemocratic methods to hold 
on to power.
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5. The Balkans are a region where Russia possesses its strongest leverage 
globally, excluding the post-Soviet space. Its position is based on a common 
cultural heritage (religion, language), history, economics and geopolitics. 
Simultaneously, the Balkans occupy an important place in the Russian his-
torical memory and its foreign policy.
6. The Balkans could become the next natural area of Russia’s “proxy war” 
with the West, besides the Baltic Sea. The region is the soft underbelly of 
Europe. Russia wields substantial potential for destabilisation there. The 
primary target of the Kremlin’s influence in the Balkans is Republika Srp-
ska in Bosnia, and then Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria.
7. Nevertheless, the importance of Russia in the region should not be overes-
timated. Moscow is capable of making life harder for the EU, for example by 
slowing down the process of the region’s European integration, but it stands 
no chance of becoming a credible alternative to the EU and to reverse the 
membership aspirations of the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Moscow 
also has limited capabilities to persuade Greece to block decisions coming 
from Brussels which are unfavourable for Russia. At the end of the day, the 
position of Brussels – read: Berlin – is decisive.
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I. Rule of law and Human RIgHts 
In soutHeasteRn euRope1  
The last quarter of a century can be described as a demographic plague that 
went through the Balkan peninsula. Indeed, the western part of the Balkans 
traditionally constitutes source of labour force for the Western economies and 
the wars in the former Yugoslavia brought about large migration and refugee 
movements.2 However, as T. Lukic admits after the International Labour Or-
ganization, the contemporary waves of emigration out of the region are not 
only related to the war, conflict and human rights violations – it is a conse-
quence of the deteriorating economic situation and the lack of labour matching 
the skills of people with middle and higher qualifications.3 
The situation is even more alarming in the countries that did not experience 
war after the fall of Communism. In comparison to 1991 Bulgaria and Romania 
have lost over 11% of their populations. The figures, are comparable only with 
the situation in Bosnia where the war killed 100,000 people and a substantial 
outflow of refugees led to similar in percentage contracting of the population. 
In comparison, in Croatia which also suffered military activity on its territory, 
the decrease in population was only 7.2%. In Serbia the fall is 8.3%.4 According 
to the Bulgarian National Statistics Institute, in the decade between 2001-2011 
the population of the country contracted by 564,000. One third of the cases 
(174,000) were a result of emigration. The citizens of the Balkan states still ap-
ply for asylum in the EU. Asylum applications have grown to roughly 70,000 
applications per year since visa requirements were abolished.5 According to 
The Economist the explanation lies in the tiredness of waiting for living stand-
ards to improve.
1 This part of the report is dedicated mainly to the countries of Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Greece, discussed during the seminar organized in the 
Chancellery of the Polish President in November 2014. However, most of the generalizations 
and remarks were trying to take into consideration also the situation in the remainder of 
the countries from the region.
2 T. Lukic, R. Stojsavljevic, B. Durdev, I. Nad, B. Dercan, Depopulation in the Western Balkan 
Countries, European Journal of Geography, volume 3, issue 2, p. 18, http://www.eurogeogra-
phyjournal.eu/articles/Lukic,%20Stojsavljevic%20et%20al,%20Depopulation_FINAL.pdf 
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 10.
5 Quitting Dreams, chasing Dreams, The Economist, 21.03.2015, pp. 23-24.
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table 1. Census result on the Balkan Peninsula 
Country population in 1991 in thousand 
population in 2011 
in thousand Change 
Bulgaria 8,487 7,928 -13,23%
BiH 4,377 3,791* -13,37%
Croatia 4,784 4,456 -6,86%
Greece 10,259 10,816 5,42%
Romania 22,810 20,121 -11,79%
Serbia (without Kosovo) 7,822 7,259 -7,21%
* In BiH census was conducted in 2013
The global wave of social protests has not spared the Balkans. Since the 
emergence of the global economic crisis virtually every country from the 
region has faced social protests. From Greece to Romania and from Bulgaria 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina popular dissatisfaction emerged with varied in-
tensity. Although it was an expression of the economic impoverishment, all 
the protests were united by the shared perception of political elite’s overt 
arrogance that no longer cares for the wreckage of decency in shaping po-
litical reality. 
The prevailing perception of political life in the Balkans recognises the cor-
rupt nature of politicians, directly linked with organised crime groups and oli-
garchs, and focused only on complete control of the economy. Its main pillars 
constitute corruption, nepotism, a dysfunctional judicial system, a shattered 
economy and exposure to external pressure. Politicians treat their fellow citi-
zens merely as a source of legitimisation for the consumption of power and the 
consolidation of politics, economics and organised crime. 
1. the rule of law in the Balkans
Despite their regional and cultural proximity and the political similarities 
of the countries from the region, international rating agencies do not consid-
er them as a homogeneous community. The regional members of the EU are 
considered part of Western Europe and those that are not, as part of Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia. Greece and Croatia are the only countries from the 
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region which are “full-fledged”6 EU members. However, the EU still expresses 
concerns about the track record of the establishment of the solid rule of law in 
Croatia and the radical tendencies that are on the rise in Greece. Bulgaria and 
Romania, despite being members of the EU, are still subject to the mechanism 
for cooperation and verification (MCV), which constitutes a unique tool of the 
EU’s internal tutoring. The remainder of countries are either candidates for 
membership or potential candidates for membership. 
According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 
2014, the Balkan EU member states are the most corrupt from the 28 countries 
of the union. The last five places are taken by Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, 
with Romania dead last. However, it is in Romania that the largest number 
of high ranked politicians are jailed for corruption. The remaining countries 
from the region are classified as “Eastern Europe and Central Asia” and in this 
group they lead the ranking, being placed among the top ten countries. Alba-
nia and Kosovo remain the most corrupt countries in the region, ranked in 
joint 110 place. Also the Rule of Law index qualifies the countries from the re-
gion in different regional groups. What seems to be apparent is that despite 
those artificial divisions, the countries of the region represent a similar level 
of respect for the rule of law. Importantly, neither EU nor NATO membership 
secures a higher score, also in this ranking. Hence, many of the countries from 
the Western Balkans (Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) scored 
higher than Bulgaria. Despite the necessary efforts to convince the European 
Commission of its determination to meet the political requirements, Serbia 
was poorly assessed and the country was classified as being the worst of the 
former Yugoslav republics and ten places behind Bulgaria. Albania is the coun-
try with the weakest Rule of Law record in the region.
Bulgaria and Romania are still subject to the MCV. Although the efficiency of 
this tool should not be overestimated, it constitutes an important indicator for 
the pace of the judicial reforms in the two countries. The most recent reports 
published in January this year showed visible differences in the attitude of the 
authorities in Bucharest and Sofia towards the need to introduce substantial 
changes. 
6 In terms that no special tools like the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification are im-
posed on them.
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table 2. Corruption and the rule of law in Southeastern Europe 
Country
transparency 
International
CpI score
transparency 
International  
CpI Rank (175 countries)
Rule of law Index
(99 countries) 
albania 33 110 63
BiH 39 80 39
Bulgaria 43 69 44
Croatia 48 61 36
greece 43 69 32
Kosovo 33 11 n/a
macedonia 45 64 34
montenegro 42 76 n/a
Romania 43 69 33
serbia 41 78 54
According to the report on Romania, “the country has made continued pro-
gress in many areas since the previous MCV reports, showing signs of 
sustainability”.7 The EC emphasised the stress laid on the direct dependence 
between the growing confidence in the judiciary (and in particular the fight 
against corruption and the growing professionalism) and the willingness to 
defend the judiciary’s independence.8 The reasons for such a positive opinion 
from the EC include a new penal code entering into force in February 2014, 
and the activity of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA). Since its 
establishment in 2005 the Directorate has conducted over 4,700 cases, with 
90% of them ending in convictions.9 Essentially, their activities led to the im-
prisonment of over a dozen of ex-ministers including a prime minister.10 The 
7 Report on Progress under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism in Romania, Euro-
pean Commission Fact Sheet, 28.1.2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO -15-3824_
en.htm
8 Ibid.
9 T. Dąbrowski, Postępy w walce z korupcją, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ana-
lizy/2014-08-20/rumunia-postepy-w-walce-z-korupcja
10 Pravitelstvo zad reszetkite, http://www.vesti.bg/sviat/balkani/rumyniia-pravitelstvo-zad-
reshetkite-6031748
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
15
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
7/
20
15
efficiency of the DNA did not remain unnoticed, since it proved to be independ-
ent from the changes on the Romanian political scene.
On the other hand concerns remain as to whether the fight against corruption 
will embrace all levels of government. Romania also provides plenty of exam-
ples of parties’ attempts to resist change through legislative and administra-
tive measures. Furthermore, the inconsistency of some of the court judgments 
remains noticeable as well as the reluctance of parliament to accommodate 
some of the court judgments, including the Supreme Court.
The European Commission’s report on Bulgaria indicated that all necessary 
reforms had been abandoned. Seven years after the implementation of the 
mechanism, the report states that “in a number of areas problems have been 
acknowledged and solutions are starting to be identified.”11 The new govern-
ment’s judicial system reform strategy and the anti-corruption strategy are 
to be implemented in practice. However, they are already a subject to fierce 
criticism. The reform of the judicial system, including the much maligned Su-
preme Judicial Council, became the subject of a trade-off among all the parties 
in parliament and its quality was encapsulated by one of Bulgaria’s electronic 
media outlets thus: “the parliament adopted the judicial strategy in a castrated 
version.”12
The adopted anti-corruption strategy stubbornly rejects the suggestion that an 
institution needs to be established which would be independent, well equipped 
in prosecuting and investigative tools, and able to introduce qualitative chang-
es in the fight against corruption. Instead, the adopted strategy provides for 
the amalgamation of the existing institutions with an anti-corruption profile 
in a single entity that will supervise the wealth of the members of the public 
administration, politicians, and members of the judiciary. On the other hand 
repressive competences will be granted to a special unit that will be composed 
of the institutions currently possessing the relevant competences. The strategy 
also sets out the post of deputy prime minister for the fight against corruption 
11 Report on Progress under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism in Bulgaria, Euro-
pean Commission Fact Sheet, Brussels, 28.01.2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-15-3825_en.htm
12 P. Paunova, Deputatite odobriha sadebnata strategiya v skopen variant, http://www.medi-
apool.bg/deputatite-odobriha-sadebnata-strategiya-v-skopen-variant-news229605.html
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and regular tests of the integrity and loyalty of employees.13 As Mikhail Ekim-
dzhiev stressed, “Apparently, far reaching trade-offs were being made, since 
[the authorities] abandoned the ideas to introduce changes in the constitution, 
withdrew from the ideas of radical reforms in the judiciary and prosecution 
authorities, rejected also the idea of external control of the prosecution.”14
Although it joined the EU as late as in 2013 Croatia, unlike Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, was not subject to the Mechanism for Cooperation and Verification. Al-
ready in 2010 the country introduced a comprehensive judicial reform strategy 
that was highly evaluated by the Council of Europe.15 On one hand the coun-
try proved it was capable of fighting corruption and sentencing high profile 
members of pharmaceutical companies and banks. The most spectacular case 
affirming the state’s determination to fight corruption was the sentencing of 
former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. However, despite these achievements, 
arguments are being raised concerning the arbitrary dismissals of defence 
evidence and other procedural violations.16 On the other hand, allegations con-
cerning the involvement of HDZ party leadership in money laundering, organ-
ised crime, drug smuggling, and war profiteering threaten the image of the 
political leaders of the country.17
According to the European Commission 2014 Serbia Progress Report, Belgrade 
still faces considerable challenges regarding the independence, impartiality, 
accountability, effectiveness and accessibility of its justice system. It is aston-
ishing that the EC recommendations replicate the expectations towards Bul-
garia to adopt clear rules for the appointment of Court Presidents, the imple-
mentation of merit based recruitment and the implementation of mechanisms 
for the equal and fair distribution of cases. Furthermore, there is an urgent 
13 Strategiyata za borba s koruptsiyata predvizda suzdavaneto na edinen organ za proverka na im-
ushtestvoto, http://www.government.bg/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0212&n =3469&g= 
14 Strategiyata za borba s koruptsiyata e mŭrtvorodena, Kapitał, 19.04.2015, http://www.capi-
tal.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2015/04/19/2515822_strategiiata_za_borba_s_korup-
ciiata_e_murtvorodena/
15 Judicial Reform Strategy, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/Cepej/profiles/Croatia_
July_2011_en.pdf 
16 J.-S. Mongrenier, Croatia’s accession and the rule of law, http://www.euractiv.com/enlarge-
ment/croatia-accession-weaken-eu-comm-analysis-529000 
17 N. Srdoc, Croatia: ‚Criminal Enterprise HDZ’ Takes Over Presidency -- Organized Crime and 
the Rise of Nationalism, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/natasha-srdoc/croatia-criminal-
enterprise-hdz-takes-over-presidency_b_6682516.html
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need to tackle the significant backlog of cases.18 Actually, in comparison to its 
EU neighbour to the east, Serbia seems much more reliable with approximate-
ly 2,000 people put on trial for corruption, 150 indictments and more than 90 
sentences in the period 2008-2010.19 However, final convictions for high-level 
corruption remain rare. On the anti-corruption path Serbia faces the same 
challenges as Bulgaria in terms of its hesitance to appropriately equip the Anti-
Corruption Agency and the Anti-Corruption Council with sufficient resources 
and appropriate leverage.20
Among the countries from the region, the one that probably most acutely expe-
riences a lack of political will to move from rhetoric to actively fighting corrup-
tion and organised crime is Bosnia and Herzegovina. The independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary is virtually a fiction and political interference is 
not decreasing.21 Although Bosnian parliamentarians have some of the highest 
salaries in Europe, their main source of income is public procurement. Ten-
ders are always pre-determined. In a 2012 UNDP survey, only 39.7% of Bosnian 
citizens reported they had trust in the Bosnian judicial system.22 The European 
Commission report spots significant shortcomings in the areas of judicial of-
fice holders’ accountability and professionalism. The country also lacks appro-
priate regulations to deal with conflicts of interest. Modest progress was made 
in reducing the backlog of cases.23 
The complicated and overloaded administrative structure of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina bears direct impact on the ability to challenge corruption. Overlap-
ping competences and a lack of appropriate coordination obstruct the efficient 
control of non-transparent accumulation of wealth. Remarkably, although 
some of the key pieces of legislation fail to comply with international stand-
ards, the necessary legal framework is largely in place. Effective investigation 
and convictions in high profile cases are what is really missing.24
18 Serbia 2014 Progress report, Commission Staff working documents, http://ec.europa.eu/en-
largement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20140108-serbia-progress-report_en.pdf, pp. 11-12. 
19 Primordial Resistance to Liberal Values, Human Rights in Serbia in 2013, Helsinki Commit-
tee for Human Rights in Serbia, p. 27.
20 Serbia 2014 Progress report, op. cit., p. 12.
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 Progress report, p. 12.
22 J. Hronesova, Bosnia, voting for the Devil you know, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/
blog/bosnia-voting-for-the-devil-you-know-1 
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 Progress report, p. 13.
24 Ibid., p. 16.
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According to the EU’s expectations, apart from Greece, all of the Balkan states 
discussed had to face the necessity of adjusting the situation following the fall 
of Communism to the rule of law. The fact remains, that despite the promising 
changes in Romania and to a certain extent in Croatia, the region has unsatis-
factory judicial standards. The problems related to the appointment of judges 
and prosecutors, the assignment of cases or the implementation of judicial rul-
ings are merely the tip of the iceberg that reveals how compromised the whole 
judicial system is. The MCV reports also provide public opinion polls revealing 
the growing awareness of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens concerning the 
mechanisms and their importance for their countries. However, these polls 
overlook the fact, that the desperate citizens of these countries still treat the 
EU as the lifeline that can force their own political elites to behave in accord-
ance with European standards. The same attitude can be noticed in Slovenia. 
Although the Croats are much more equivocal in their trust towards the EU, 
they do not trust their national institutions more than the rest of the Balkan 
EU members. Remarkably, the Greeks remain the only country where the dis-
astrous economic situation does not allow society to remain without opinion 
and where the trust in national government and parliament reaches the EU’s 
lowest results. Despite Greeks negatively associating the EU with the auster-
ity measures, respondents proved to trust the EU twice as much as their own 
main political institutions.
chart 1. Eurobarometer. Trust towards the EU 
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chart 2. Eurobarometer. Trust towards the National Parliament 
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chart 3. Eurobarometer. Trust towards the National Government 
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The attempts to introduce reforms in the judicial systems of Serbia, Bosnia and 
Bulgaria are inept. The Serbian Helsinki Committee on Human Rights state-
ment seems most accurate and symptomatic for all the countries mentioned: 
“Although strongly critical about the implementation of the judicial reform 
while in opposition, the incumbent regime has done little to compensate the 
neg ative effects since it came to power.”25 The problems are not in the absence of 
an appropriate legal framework (although in many cases it can be substantially 
25 Primordial Resistance to Liberal Values, op. cit., p. 27.
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improved), but in the conscious political sabotage conducted by national, re-
gional or local political elites. 
It seems obvious that any reform requires appropriate strategic planning. 
However, the preparation of strategy itself became a tool in the political ne-
gotiations with the EU. The Serbian example of 91 sector and 14 multi-sector 
strategies of varying quality and frequent overlaps with no assessment of their 
impact on the national budget reveals the substitutive nature of strategies to 
mark activity, instead of genuinely introducing changes.
2. organized crime
Organised crime remains one of the main challenges for all the states in the 
region. Its roots can be seen in a number of separate but overlapping events. 
The secret services of the Communist states used drug trafficking as a tool in 
the ideological struggle against the West. The end of communism and the dis-
mantlement of the secret services ended their political influence, but not their 
links. The abdication of the state from performing its basic functions opened 
new opportunities to provide security based on forced tribute, thus establish-
ing the roots of the organised crime. 
The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the UN embargo provided new op-
portunities for the rapid accumulation of wealth and enhanced cooperation 
among newly established organised crime groups. The wars also produced the 
paramilitary organisations that became famous for their atrocities. After the 
conflicts they became the pillars of the criminal underground often closely re-
lated to the government. Slowly but surely, from a marginal group organised 
crime became an indispensable part of daily life. 
As they grew in power, those people quickly obtained the necessary political 
umbrella that allowed them to become recognised as entrepreneurs. It became 
extremely difficult to distinguish between a criminal and a businessman. The 
traces of organised crime in the Balkans extend beyond the borders of the indi-
vidual states. The links between the members of the former Communist politi-
cal elites, their protégés and the officially recognised political leaders have far 
reaching consequences for the level of trust people have in the political system 
and for the growing popular cynicism. 
According to the European Commission reports, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ser-
bia, Macedonia, and Kosovo remain countries of origin, transit and destination 
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for the trafficking of human beings for the purpose of labour, sexual exploitation, 
begging, and forced marriages. Kosovo is also associated with the black market 
in human organs. Therefore, organised crime remains a serious concern.26 
3. freedom of the press
One of the key indicators of a well-functioning democracy is a free press. While 
performing their entertainment, educational and information functions, they 
also play the crucial role of watchdogs, monitoring and securing the balance 
between the competences of the authorities and the interests of society and 
individuals. In order to perform these functions efficiently, the press must be 
independent and professional.
table 3. Media freedom on the Balkans
freedom House 
Rank 2014
freedom House 
Rank 2015
Reporters without 
frontiers 2014
albania 98 97 85
BiH 103 50 66
Bulgaria 78 75 100
Croatia 83 40 65
greece 92 107 99
Kosovo 98 97 80
macedonia 122 125 123
montenegro 78 78 n/a
Romania 84 84 45
serbia 74 80 54
According to the Freedom House Press Freedom Ranking, all the countries 
from the region are recognised as partly free.27 Despite the large discrepan-
26 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 Progress report, p. 16.
27 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2014/press-freedom-rankings#.VT-
615MncYR
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cies of the quality of media freedom in the region, certain regularities can be 
observed. The question of the transparency of media ownership remains an is-
sue in most of the countries from the region. The intimidation of journalists is 
prevalent and examples of arrested, persecuted, beaten or questioned journal-
ists can be found in all the countries from the region without exception. Death 
threats and attacks on private property also occur. 
Furthermore, the lack of transparency regarding media ownership and the 
apparent bias of media coverage result in respect for them decreasing. Par-
ticular journalists and media are associated with biased political agendas, 
thus depriving themselves the role of watchdog and becoming solely tools of 
propaganda. 
The Bulgarian Helsinki Report for 2014 and the EU 2014 report on Serbia pro-
vided alarming examples of self-censorship, strong economic and political 
dependence of the press and a lack of the basic ethical rules of journalism.28 
In Bulgaria, their unclear ownership structure and biased reporting became 
even more apparent during the banking crisis that emerged after the bank-
ruptcy of KTB bank. In Bosnia intimidation and threat against journalists and 
editors, and the polarisation of the media along political and ethnic lines in-
tensified prior to the October general elections and during the protests in Feb-
ruary 2014. In Greece, the economic crisis has borne specific impact also on 
freedom of the press. On one hand, journalists are victims of physical attacks 
by members of Golden Dawn. On the other, within the government’s austerity 
measures, the state broadcaster was closed down.29 However, the new govern-
ment plans to revive it.
Generally, a very dangerous and negative trend can be observed in the Bal-
kans. Once old or incumbent political elites obtain a grip on power, they im-
mediately remodel the media environment in the country. The 2015 Freedom 
House report identifies the negative trend in the Western Balkans where the 
Serbian authorities curbed the reporting of floods, and in Macedonia several 
opposition outlets were closed down and the journalist Tomislav Kezarovski 
was still in detention. In Montenegro Milo Dukanovic decided to confront the 
28 BHC Annual Report on the State of Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2014: Suppression of the Hu-
man Rights of the Most Vulnerable Continues, http://www.bghelsinki.org/en/news/press/
single/bhc-annual-report-state-human-rights-bulgaria-2014-suppression-human-rights-
most-vulnerable-continues/; Serbia 2014 Progress report, op. cit. 
29 World press freedom index 2014, https://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php
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main newspapers in the country upon returning to power.30 Events in Bulgaria 
can be added to that picture since on the one hand there is a dangerous concen-
tration of media in the hands of one owner who is an active politician directly 
linked to the previous government and, on the other, the recent conduct of the 
authorities in their judicially approved seizure of media equipment reveals the 
level of active involvement of the media in the internal political struggle.31 
Another dangerous tool for the manipulation of the press was most vividly exposed 
in the EC annual report on Bosnia and concerns their financing by the government 
through the excessive advertisement of public companies run by political parties. 
This money often follows political party affiliations and influence editorial poli-
cies.32 Similar trends have been observed in Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania.33 
The list of violations must also include the actions of various administrative 
bodies (such as the Bulgarian Financial Oversight Commission), which through 
extensive and creative actions constitute a legal stick to beat the media with.34 
Journalists are also often under pressure to reveal their sources. Furthermore, 
regulatory bodies like the Bosnian Communication Regulatory Agency, the 
Bulgarian Council for Electronic Media and public broadcasters require politi-
cal, financial and institutional independence.
4. Human Rights and the protection of minorities
An overview of judgments and violations of the European Court of Human 
Rights constitutes a litmus test concerning the relations between the state and 
the individual. According to ECHR statistics the Balkan states encounter the 
strongest difficulties in securing the right to fair trial and length of proceed-
ings (Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia), and the right 
30 Freedom of the Press 2015, Freedom House, p. 9, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/
files/FreedomofthePress_2015_FINAL.pdf 
31 The case concerns the events of April 29, 2015 when a bailiff supported by massive Police 
presence entered the premises of TV7 and seized the equipment necessary for broadcasting, 
arguing that it was purchased by a loan from KTB bank, which was de facto nationalised af-
ter it was declared insolvent.
32 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 Progress report, op. cit., p. 17.
33 For Romania see L. Rusch, Media Freedom in Romania, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 31.03.2015, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/en/71.13620/; for Serbia Serbia 2014 Progress report 2014, op. cit. for 
Bulgaria, Pravata na choveka v Bulgariya 2014, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee Report 2014, 
pp. 35-43, http://www.bghelsinki.org/media/uploads/annual_reports/annual_bhc_re-
port_2014_issn-2367-6930_bg.pdf
34 Pravata na choveka v Bulgariya, op. cit., pp. 35-43.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
24
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
07
/2
01
5
to liberty and security (Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia and Greece). The pro-
tection of property also remains a significant challenge. The fact that Bulgaria, 
Romania and Greece are among the countries with the highest numbers of judg-
ments concerning inhumane and degrading treatment should also be a source 
of grave concern. Only Russia, Turkey and Ukraine outrank them in this issue.35
Virtually every country of the region has a Roma minority, particularly in 
the central, eastern and southern parts of the peninsula. However, regardless 
of their levels of concentration, Roma are subject to mistreatment on virtually 
the whole Balkans. The marginalisation and stigmatisation of this particular 
community is also visible in the number of cases of inhumane and degrading 
treatment and the violation of the right to liberty and security submitted to the 
ECHR. Despite the existence of numerous programmes for the integration of 
this community – including those financed by international donors – no tangi-
ble improvement can be noticed in their political, economic or social position. 
Instead, numerous cases of mob violence and open confrontations involving 
Roma took place in Romania, Bulgaria and Greece. The 2014 flooding in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia disproportionately affected the Roma communi-
ties limiting their access to health services and social housing.36 Romania and 
Bulgaria are also criticised for the living conditions of the Roma community. 
In Romania another acute problem is the forced eviction of Roma.37 In Croa-
tia many Roma children are still attending segregated classes.38 Roma are also 
particularly vulnerable to electoral fraud orchestrated by political parties. 
Roma are also among the groups from the Balkans that most often apply for 
asylum in EAA countries.
Furthermore, societal discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual trans­
gender and intersexual (LGBTI) people and those with HIV/AIDS remain 
problems. The US State Department Human Rights reports for 2013 explicit-
ly recognized this problem in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, and Croatia. Although in 2014 Belgrade the Pride Parade took place 
and Croatia adopted civil partnership legislation39, the problem is still acute. 
35 ECHR, Overview 1959-2014, p. 8, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592014_
ENG.pdf
36 The State of the World’s Human Rights, Amnesty International Report 2014/15, p. 81, 321.
37 Ibid., p. 303.
38 Ibid., p. 122.
39 Balkans: Lagging Rights Protections, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/balkans-lag-
ging-rights-protections 
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In Greece the hate crimes rate against these groups was observed to have in-
creased in 2014.40 Furthermore, anti-Semitism remain a problem in Romania 
and Croatia. Human trafficking remains a challenge for all the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia.41
The Balkan peninsula also faces an increased influx of illegal migrants from Syr-
ia, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries. Only for the period 2013-2014 
over 18,000 asylum applications were submitted in Bulgaria. However, these fig-
ures do not embrace the whole stream of illegal migrants crossing the Bulgarian 
and Greek borders and making their way towards the West. The Balkans consti-
tute a significant channel for illegal immigration. The immigrants themselves 
are subject to push backs on the borders, poor conditions in the refugee centres 
and random acts of xenophobia. These problems are particularly acute in Bul-
garia, Greece and Serbia. In Bulgaria the domestic law requiring new pupils to 
pass an exam in the Bulgarian language brought only 98 out of 520 registered 
refugee children to school in September 2014.42 The Greek authorities promptly 
closed the case of an alleged push back of a boat with illegal immigrants, which 
allegedly caused the death of 27 refugees near the island of Farmakonisi.43
5. post war challenges
The countries of the former Yugoslavia still face significant challenges after the 
wars, such as re-possession of occupancy rights, missing persons, and discrimi-
nation on the grounds of ethnicity.44 Most of the necessary regional internation-
al agreements are in place. In February 2013 a war crimes protocol was signed 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro. However, 
it has not to date led to new prosecutions or convictions.45 There is also limited 
progress in prosecuting war crimes in national courts.46 According to Amnesty 
International, impunity for war crimes of sexual violence remains rampant. The 
estimated number of rape victims during the war in Bosnia alone was as high as 
40 The State of the World’s Human Rights, op. cit. p. 164.
41 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, U.S. Department of State, http://www.
state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper 
42 The State of the World’s Human Rights, p. 88.
43 Ibid., p. 164.
44 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014 Progress report, op. cit. p. 16.
45 Balkans: Lagging Rights Protections, op. cit. 
46 Ibid. 
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50,000 and for the last decade less than 100 cases had gone to court.47 The ques-
tion of reparations for the families of the missing is still to be addressed in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, the existence of de facto segregated schools 
under the principle of  “two schools under one roof” and the continuing failure of 
the country to implement the Sejdic-Finci and Zornic v. BiH rulings of the ECHR 
reveal the gravity of the ethnic issue in present-day Bosnia.
6. Conclusions
The status quo on the Balkan peninsula does not support the argument that EU 
membership entails a substantially higher level of the rule of law and human 
rights protection. The example of Bulgaria in particular reveals the fact that, 
while being a member of the EU, the country is able to substantially deteriorate 
its theoretically basic political values. Despite the EU mechanisms for supervi-
sion and close cooperation with the national authorities, the legitimisation of 
the local political elites seems to play a more important role, and once they join 
the EU, they became part of the European mainstream. The need for internal 
reforms was thus replaced by a reaffirmation of the existing status quo and 
the adjustment of the national political pathologies to the European legal and 
political discourse.
However, Romania provides much more positive arguments. From a country 
with severe internal difficulties and an unstable political system in which po-
litical opponents were ready to employ all possible means to discredit their ad-
versaries in clashes, the country became a producer of a recognisable track 
record of internal improvement in the areas of the rule of law and freedom of 
the press. Despite noticeable attempts of politicians to sabotage the process, 
the introduction of efficient internal institutions with cadres unrelated to the 
political connections can serve as a good example for the other countries from 
the region.
The determination of the national political elites to impose the necessary 
reforms remains crucial. In most of the countries the desire to improve the 
quality of the rule of law and human rights is rather externally imposed than 
internally apprehended. The EU expects that in Bulgaria the reforms will be 
conducted by a government directly tied to the most acute pathologies of the 
last quarter of a century and this is symptomatic of the wider picture. 
47 The State of the World’s Human Rights, op. cit. p. 81.
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In Serbia, the former Euro sceptic leaders are today the strongest protagonists 
of European integration. The rationale for this ideological U-turn was driven 
by the sober calculation that the stubborn Serbian position on the Kosovo and 
EU issues left the country outside the mainstream European development and 
in the long run could lead to a widening civilizational, economic and political 
gap. Secondly, the regional pressure exerted by the fact that Croatia joined the 
EU forced the nationalist political elites to swallow the bitter pill of the loss of 
Kosovo. The pace of reforms is absolutely necessary for EU membership, but 
the question remains as to what extent it is driven by the perspective of mem-
bership and to what extent by the understanding that the existing political 
situation is incompatible with Western liberal values.
Bosnia remains a prisoner of its own artificial structure, overblown adminis-
tration and the deep ethnic divisions that leave the country without any per-
spective for the future. The political elites benefit from the permanent smoul-
dering of ethnic tensions. On the other hand, the deep disproportion between 
the average income of Bosnian citizens and politicians made involvement in 
politics a lucrative business combining the accumulation of wealth with the 
ability to obstruct any changes to the system.
The lack of natural exchange of the political elite through the democratic pro-
cess has become one of the most important obstacles for political apathy and 
popular alienation from politics. The Romanian example of Klaus Iohannis 
stands alone. Greece is another example of apparent changes in the elite, but it 
is a consequence of a deep and relatively abrupt social impoverishment.
Paradoxically, the improvements in one area of the political situation of the 
Balkan countries are counterbalanced by prompt deterioration in another 
area. For example, the Bulgarian political instability of 2013-2014 was resolved 
with the return to power of the second Borisov government. While the EU and 
the US are much more supportive for his government, Bulgaria is simultane-
ously plunging in all rankings concerning human rights and the rule of law. In 
Serbia, the securing of the pro-European orientation of the government was 
traded for a deterioration in the freedom of speech and hectic judicial reforms. 
In Bosnia, the price of ethnic peace is the acceptance of the privatisation of the 
administration on ethnic principles. In Croatia, the question remains open as 
to whether the pre-accession mobilisation for reforms will generate sufficient 
momentum to continue improving its record, or if it will follow the Romanian 
and Bulgarian examples of fossilising the political status quo. The Greek ex-
perience is the most terrifying, because it was the only country in the region 
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to be strongly integrated in the process of European integration. Today, after 
years of economic crisis, its living standard has significantly deteriorated and 
radicalism is replacing the monopoly of the compromised European values. 
The Romanian successes in the field of the fight against corruption and the 
fact that the underdog won the presidential elections support the argument 
of Claudia Ciobanu who claims that, unlike Bulgaria, the massive protests 
provoked the birth of a civil society that is genuinely ready not only to re-
sist the government, but also to participate actively in the construction of 
the common good. The Romanian successes should thus serve as a source of 
inspiration and a role model for countries willing to move closer to the EU 
rather than the Balkans.
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II. soutHeasteRn euRope stuCK  
In eConomIC tRansItIon
Since 1989 former Communist countries have gone through economic transfor-
mation and the process of building a sustainable democracy. In Southeastern 
Europe48 – excluding Greece and Slovenia – the transformation process lagged 
behind Central Europe. However, following the stabilisation of the region from 
2000 onwards the Southeastern countries recorded accelerated growth and 
many successes were achieved in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation and 
liberalisation. The transformation brought about a reintegration of Southeast-
ern countries into the global economy and an improvement in living stand-
ards. But fast economic growth to 2008 led to the false impression that they 
would quickly catch up with the rest of European Union (EU) without the need 
for reform. The global economic crisis exposed the weakness of the growth 
model which was being pursued by many countries in the region based on FDI 
and loans but a lack of productive investment.
Although the Southeastern countries are at various stages of EU integration 
and development levels, at present there is clear divergence from the core of 
the EU and the process of catching-up with advanced economies is slower in 
the case of those countries than those of Central Europe. The deteriorating eco-
nomic situation caused by the global crisis has had wider consequences not 
only for the determination to implement economic reforms but also for the 
quality of democracy, which is still fragile in the region. In those countries 
which achieved EU membership lack the motivation for further reform and 
populism movements have gained public support, making reform less viable. 
On the other hand, political elites in those outside of EU observe that their 
membership perspective is constantly questioned and they thus prefer to re-
sort to undemocratic methods to retain power than to launch reforms. All the 
countries of the region need to revive the momentum of reform otherwise the 
convergence with rest of the EU will be hard to achieve. 
1. the southeastern periphery 
The region consists of rather small economies. Greece is the largest with 
a population of 11 million and GDP at €182 billion.49 Romania is second with 
48 In this paper “Southeastern Europe” refers to: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia.
49 Eurostat.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
30
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
07
/2
01
5
20 million inhabitants and GDP at €142 billion.50 The others have between sev-
en million to only half a million inhabitants and the smallest economies have 
GDP of around €8 billion. Although some of them were genuinely successful 
in the process of catching up with the level of development in the advanced 
economies, still Southeastern Europe lags well behind average EU standards in 
terms of basic economic development indicators such as GDP per capita in PPS. 
Even the best ones are at a level of 70-80% of the EU-28 average GDP. There is 
also a clear gap between the countries in the EU and those outside it. Slovenia, 
Greece and Croatia are the most developed countries on a level comparable to 
those in Central Europe. Bulgaria and Romania are the poorest ones in the EU 
but still have a higher income level than those outside the EU. In Kosovo, Al-
bania and Bosnia and Herzegovina GDP per capita in PPS is lowest and they are 
one of the poorest countries in Europe. From among the 11 countries, Greece 
became an EU member state long before the others – in 1981, Slovenia was next, 
in 2004, with Romania and Bulgaria following in 2007 and Croatia is the most 
recent, joining in 2013. The others have prospects of EU membership. 
chart 4. GDP per capita in PPS in 2013 as % of EU average
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The process of the reform in Southeastern Europe51 was delayed in com-
parison to Central European countries. The military conflicts followed the 
50 Ibid. 
51 Greece, which did not experience communist rule and was already EU member state and 
was not subject to the processes. Also Slovenia is partially excluded from this development 
as it quickly started transformation. 
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disintegration of Yugoslavia had negative impact on the development also 
in those countries which were not directly involved in warfare since all the 
region was perceived as unstable. The transitional recession for almost all 
Southeastern countries was also more dramatic. Three countries Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia still haven’t achieved the 1989 level of de-
velopment.52 Collapse in GDP following the introduction of market reforms was 
twice as severe as in Central Europe and recovery was far more sluggish.53 The 
ex-Yugoslavia countries faced the consequences of sanctions, civil unrest, the 
destruction of infrastructure and hyperinflation and Albania was completely 
autarkic. For these reasons at the beginning of transformation the macroeco-
nomic condition of the countries in the region were worse than those in Cen-
tral Europe. The political stabilisation in the first decade of the XXI century 
brought new momentum in reforms and remarkable change for Southeastern 
Europe. The democratic and economic transformation gained pace, leading 
some countries to EU membership. 
2. Reform pattern 
Although, there are significant regional differences in the level of development 
in the countries in the region, their reform strategies are similar. This was due 
to the important influence of external factors (the IMF and later on the EU) in 
shaping reform priorities. Almost all of the countries in Southeastern Europe 
are successful in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation and trade liberalisa-
tion. Inflation was gradually reduced and some fiscal consolidation was im-
plemented. In comparison to EU countries public debt remained low until the 
global crisis began. Price, trade and exchange liberalisation was introduced. 
Small scale privatisation was conducted. But in terms of a systemic change of 
the real economy and structural reforms, they are far behind. In consequence, 
they are now facing similar problems, although they are more severe in the 
case of those countries outside the EU. The incomplete economic transition is 
holding back the development of the countries in the whole region. 
In the case of large-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructur-
ing, and competition policy, the region is lagging behind the old EU members.54 
52 The Economics of Secession. Analyzing the economic impact of the collapse of the former 
Yugoslavia, http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WP/WP1408.pdf
53 http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0064.pdf, p. 2. 
54 EBRD transition indicators, www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/macrodata/
tic2012.xlsx 
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As research conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment shows there is no significant difference in this sphere between the 
countries in the EU and those outside it. The public sector still has a signifi-
cant share in GDP. Government spending as percentage of GDP is especially 
high in Greece (51,2%), Slovenia (50,8%) Bosnia and Herzegovina (49%) and 
Serbia (45,2%).55 Privatisation was moved ahead primarily in the non-trada-
ble sector (e.g. banking, telecommunication and in some cases energy). The 
banking sector in most of the countries was transformed and dominated by 
foreign companies. Slovenia, where the biggest banks stayed public, is an ex-
ception. Large public enterprises in historically important industries – such 
as metal, shipyards, utilities and railways have been hard to privatise due 
to large social opposition and few bidders.56 They usually stayed public and 
are dependent on public aid. In situations when privatisation was carried 
out, enterprises often were sold not to a strategic investor with capital and 
know-how but to insiders; this frequently caused them either to collapse or to 
perform substandardly. This lead to deindustrialisation on a more advanced 
scale than in Central Europe. 
The countries in the region have not introduced a comprehensive pension sys-
tem or social welfare reform to correspond better to the need of ageing socie-
ties. Pension spending is much higher in most Southeastern countries than in 
Central Europe, ranging from almost 10% of GDP to almost 18% of GDP in Greece 
where it is highest. The system is unsustainable in the longer run as the popu-
lation is ageing and where a large informal economy and high unemployment 
both limit revenues.57 
The judiciary remains ineffective and unable to ensure the rule of law in key 
areas. Weak administrative capacities limit the speed of the reform and un-
dermine the absorption capacities for public investment in the area of much-
needed infrastructure.58 This is slowing down the process of catching up; for 
example Bulgaria and Romania are the least efficient in spending EU funds and 
the latter in 2013 had the lowest level of absorption of EU funds in Europe, at 
55 2015 Index of Economic Freedom.
56 The Western Balkans. 15 Years of Economic Transition, Washington, International Mone-
tary Fund, 2015, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2015/eur/eng/pdf/erei_sr_ 
030915.pdf, p. 22.
57 Ibid, p. 62. 
58 The Western Balkans in Transition, Occasional Papers, No 46, European Commission, Di-
rectorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/publications/publication15155_en.pdf
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about 34%.59 The countries outside the EU have also failed to use all the finan-
cial assistance (IPA Fund) available for them from the EU.60 
An ineffective and overstaffed public sector is consuming a large proportion of 
budget revenues and is main cause of an unfavourable business environment. 
In the World Bank Ranking of ease of doing business the countries in the region 
are lagging behind, except Macedonia and Montenegro. This strongly impedes 
their competitiveness. Red tape and corruption also hamper economic activity. 
3. the decade of growth 
Between 2000 and 2008 economies in the region recorded a strong increase in 
GDP – around 6% per year on average. Their growth model was based mainly 
on expansion in domestic demand financed by external sources (loans, FDI, 
remittances) and to a lesser extent on export growth. Rapid growth brought 
a visible improvement in living standards, household income increased and 
poverty was reduced. 
However, rapid development overshadowed the structural problems of the 
economies in the region and diminished the political will for the introduc-
tion of comprehensive, structural reform. The huge inflow of capital also 
led to asymmetric expansion in the consumption and creation of exter-
nal debts, the trade deficit and low savings rates, which made the south-
easter economies more vulnerable to external shocks.61 The type of FDI that 
poured into the region is mainly focused on non-tradable sectors and this 
deepened the asymmetries. Those economies are still dominated mostly by 
low value added activities and in all of them the contribution of net export 
to GDP remain negative (excepting Slovenia). 
Foreign capital has played an important role in the transformation of post-
Communist countries. During the first decade of transition due to political in-
stability the FDI inflow in the region was low. Improved political conditions 
59 EU Funds in Central and Eastern Europe Progress Report 2007-2013, http://www.kpmg.com/
CEE/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/EU%20Funds%20in%20Cen-
tral%20and%20Eastern%20Europe%202013.pdf 
60 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/ipa-2013-annual-report-print-
ed-version_en.pdf
61 South East Europe after the Economic Crisis: a New Dawn or back to Business as Usual? 
W. Bartlett, V. Monastiriotis, London 2009, p. 7.
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and an enhancement of the business environment brought a significant in-
crease of FDI in the first decade of the XXI century. Although all the South-
eastern Europe countries register an increase in FDI, they have a significantly 
lower FDI stock in relation to Central European countries. FDI stock in South-
eastern countries in 2013 was 268 billion USD and in four countries in Central 
Europe – 556,9 billion USD. Furthermore Romania alone attracted almost one 
third of all investment to the region (USD 84.5 billion). Bulgaria ranked second 
attracting almost one fifth. 
There are several explanations for low value of FDI in the region. First of all, 
most Southeastern countries are late-transformers. Introducing political and 
macroeconomic stability was delayed in comparison to Central Europe coun-
tries. The domestic markets are significantly smaller and the distance from 
the investing economies like Germany is greater.62 The underdeveloped infra-
structure make the problem of distance is even harder. An unfavourable busi-
ness environment also reduces the quantity of FDI in the region. Those outside 
EU also attacked significantly lower amount of FDI since they are perceived as 
less stable. 
FDI and foreign loans were mainly biased towards the non-tradable sector and 
consumption rather than investment and thus have no significant impact on 
productivity growth and the creation of a strong export base.63 The service 
sector accounted for most incoming FDI stock, reaching an average of 69.8% 
of the total by 2010. Banking, real estate, telecommunication and retail trade 
have attracted the most investment. Only three countries attracted a signifi-
cant amount of FDI in manufacturing by 2010: BiH (35%), Macedonia (31%) and 
Romania (32%).64 The lowest share was in Albania (16%) and Bulgaria (19%). In 
contrast the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia attracted over 30% of FDI in 
manufacturing. 
Despite much lower levels of FDI into Southeastern Europe, its role in total 
investment is much higher than in Central Europe because less developed 
countries require more FDI in order to finance investment as they do not have 
62 S.Estrin, M.Uvalic, Foreign direct investment into transition economy: Are the Balkans dif-
ferent, LEQE Paper no 64/2013, p. 6.
63 The Western Balkans in Transition, op. cit.
64 S.Estrin, M.Uvalić, op. cit., p. 22.
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domestic savings.65 FDI also serves the current account deficit. The sharp drop 
in FDI after 2008 for this region not only meant problems financing the trade 
deficit but also losing a source of growth. 
chart 5. FDI in millions US$
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4. modest export capacities – huge imports 
Significant external imbalances are an important challenge for Southeastern 
Europe’s economies. EU member states and neighbourhood countries are the 
largest trading partner for the region.66 In 2000 those outside EU were granted 
a preferential regime, which allows almost all their products to enter the EU 
without custom duties or upper limits. 
Trade liberalisation with the EU and other countries has contributed to a re-
markable increase in foreign trade; in some countries it was even fivefold.67 
This revival brought a much faster increase in imports then exports. After 
a period of repressed household consumption, the countries in the region re-
corded a strong increase in the demand for durables and other goods.68 At the 
65 A. Inotai: The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, Brussels, 
2007, p. 56.
66 For the countries outside the EU, trade with EU member states accounts for 72.7% of their 
imports and 81.8% of their exports. 
67 M. Uvalic, The economic development of the Western Balkans since Thessaloniki, Sarajevo 
2013, p. 75. 
68 The Western Balkans in Transition, op. cit., p. 9. 
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same time the access to international financial markets improved significantly 
due to the development of the banking sector, which is in the majority owned 
by foreign companies. Since local production could not satisfy this growing 
demand, the deficit in current account balances increased significantly, espe-
cially in the pre-crisis period. Although the crisis reduced imports and exports 
the situation in many countries is alarming. In Montenegro the trade deficit 
reached 40% of GDP in 2014, in Kosovo and BiH it is over 30%, and in Albania 
and Macedonia it is 21%. In the case of EU members the situation is much bet-
ter. Only in Croatia is the trade deficit over 15%. In the pre-crisis period 2000-
2008 the current account deficit was mainly financed by remittances, foreign 
private lending and FDI. Since 2008, though, a significant decrease has been 
noted in all these areas. 
Although all the countries in the region have increased their exports since 
2001, the high current account and foreign trade deficit indicate that those 
countries have a relatively narrow export base and are less competitive. FDI 
did not significantly improve the situation. Only Slovenia and Bulgaria are 
exceptions from this pattern as both countries were able to develop strong 
export base. All the others export significantly less in terms of value and 
they are less sophisticated products with loweradded value than Central Eu-
ropean countries. In the case of such small economies, export is one of the 
main sources of growth, but in order to achieve that, investment in produc-
tivity is needed. 
chart 6. Export as % of GDP 
2001 2013
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5. persistent unemployment   
Structural problems and a weak economy are keeping unemployment at the 
highest level in Europe. Low job creation is a major concern in the region and 
a challenge for higher future growth. Only in Slovenia and Bulgaria is unem-
ployment below the EU-28 average. Even during times of growth the regional 
economies failed to create many jobs and after 2008 they registered large-scale 
lay offs during the economic crisis. Furthermore, long-term and youth unem-
ployment are a pervasive aspect of the Western Balkans labour markets. Only 
in Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania youth unemployment is between 20% and 
30%. In others countries well over half of 15-25 year olds are unemployed (BiH – 
60%, Kosovo – 58%).69 This is not only economically harmful but also politically 
and socially dangerous. Furthermore, the activity rate of the population aged 
20-64 is also low in this region. The persistence of unemployment regardless of 
cyclical conditions is mainly caused by the structure of FDI, large emigration 
and high remittances, and also labour market rigidity. 
chart 7. Unemployment [%]
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69 Kosovo 2014 Progress Report, Commission Staff working documents, http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-kosovo-progress-report_en.pdf, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 2014 Progress Report, Commission Staff working documents, http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2014/20141008-bosnia-and-herzegovina-pro-
gress-report_en.pdf 
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Western Balkan countries are latecomers to the transition process and 
hence FDI stocks and private sector job creation are still lagging behind 
Central Europe.70 Investment, which went into non-tradable services did 
not create many well paid jobs. Moreover migrants account for roughly for 
25% of the population of those countries which are not EU members and 
6% of the population of whole region.71 Thus the region’s reliance on remit-
tances tends to raise the pay which people are willing to work for. In many 
countries the legacy of Communism has contributed to rigidity in labour 
market regulation and a high level of protection for employees. This has 
rather enhanced employment in the informal sector and discouraged job 
creation. 
The structure of employment in many countries is also indicative of the deep-
seated problems of these economies, especially in Western Balkans countries. 
Most people work in the agricultural or public sectors. In Albania 44.6% work 
in agriculture. In Serbia one fifth of total employment is in agriculture and 
about a third in the public sector. Moreover informal employment remains 
substantial. According to Labour Force Survey, informal employment is grow-
ing. In 2014 in Serbia 21% were employed in the informal economy. In Koso-
vo 30-35% of GDP is created in the informal sector according to the European 
Commission reports. 
Due to the high unemployment rate, many people are leaving the region and 
are moving mainly to old EU member states. This lowers unemployment in SEE 
countries but also mainly young and well-educated people are leaving which 
can hamper growth in the longer run. 
6. stabilisation on credit
The countries in Southeastern Europe have felt the impact of the economic 
crisis through the financial sector and the reduction in the of the capital in-
flow, which till then had fuelled growth. However, the recession in the re-
gion was less severe (with the exception of Greece) than in the rest of the EU, 
but the post-crisis recovery is weak. The crisis also displaced the structural 
problems of local economies but countries in the region have been avoiding 
70 The Western Balkans. 15 Years of Economic Transition, op. cit., p. 34. 
71 World average is 3%. Coping with Floods, Strengthening Growth, South East Europe Regu-
lar Economic Report, World Bank, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/World-
bank/document/eca/seerer7-eng-report.pdf, p. 55.
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introducing reforms or austerity measures in the hope that the crisis will be 
short-lived. 
During first decade of the XXI Century Southeastern Europe countries im-
proved the general government balance but only Macedonia and Croatia re-
duced current spending. In countries like Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro and 
Albania the adjustment was mainly due to an increase in revenues.72 Serbia 
and Montenegro benefited additionally from 66% of debts written off by the 
London and Paris Club.73 Although the increase in revenues was matched by 
higher spending, the Southeastern Europe countries entered the crisis period 
with a rather low level of government debt. In most cases it was far below the 
ceiling recommended by Ecofin of 60% of GDP. 
In the pre-crisis period mandatory expenditure, particularly public sector 
wages and pensions increased. After 2008 due to declining economic activity, 
revenues decreased but at the same time governments faced political pres-
sure to protect social spending and wages. Also subsidies for the unprofitable 
public sector companies have become a heavy burden on the budget. Govern-
ments in the region tried to avoid introducing austerity measures and fiscal 
cuts in order to adjust to decreasing revenues. This strategy was based on 
the assumption that cuts would further diminish falling domestic demand 
and that the crisis would soon be over. In consequence the budget deficits 
increased in all the countries. For example in Serbia and Montenegro the av-
erage budget deficit was 5.6% and 4.54% respectively for last five years. This 
strategy proved to be shortsighted and longer than expected stagnation led to 
a rapid growth of public debt. In Serbia and Albania the general government 
debt reached 71% of GDP in 2014. But the most dynamic increase was recorded 
in EU member countries Slovenia and Croatia, which in 2014 had general gov-
ernment debt at 80% of GDP. 
72 The Western Balkans in Transition, op. cit., p. 7. 
73 The debts of other countries were also significantly reduced in the 90s. 
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chart 8. General government debt as % of GDP 
2008 2013
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Countries in Central Europe returned to growth by devaluing their curren-
cies but in the countries in the region this is impossible. Slovenia and Greece 
adopted euro as their currency and also Montenegro and Kosovo have done so 
unilaterally; others have fixed or nearly fixed exchange rates. Furthermore, in 
countries like Croatia or Serbia a large part of the loans are foreign-currency 
denominated. Thus improving competitiveness through devaluation in these 
countries is either impossible or difficult and risky. 
7. Crisis and reform
As shown in the Transition Reports of European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the reform in Southeastern Europe were stalled in the 
mid-2000s with the exception of some Western Balkans countries, which 
have continued to introduce some changes due to the process of integra-
tion with the, EU but in this case at rather a slow pace.74 Although the crisis 
proved that further progress in democratic and economic transition reform 
are badly needed, it had the opposite consequences. The governments in the 
region tended to avoid reforms and tried to protect the status quo in the hope 
that recovery on a global scale would automatically lead to growth in their 
countries. Croatia and Slovenia have been forced to re-introduced large scale 
privatisation by their huge budget deficits and other countries, like Albania 
74 Stuck in Transition, EBRD Report, http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/transition/
tr13.pdf, p. 13.
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and Serbia, are planning to follow their course. It is symptomatic that in the 
first two countries, in which huge valuable assets are still in public owner-
ship, society is rather sceptical about privatisation. This is due to the wide-
spread perception that a non-transparent privatisation process benefits only 
a tiny local elite. 
There is a sense in the region that reforms have under-delivered and failed to 
bring significant changes for economic performance. Even in those countries 
in which economic indicators show the opposite, like in Bulgaria where GDP 
per capita in PPS increased from 33% of EU average in 2003 to 45% in 2014 soci-
ety is disappointed. In all the countries in the region except Bulgaria support 
for the liberal market economy decline between 2006–2010. A similar process 
can be also observed in Central Europe. In both regions support for markets 
reforms is visibly smaller than in advanced economies.75 At the same time, al-
though reform fatigue is persistent in the whole region, societies still support 
them. In Croatia 91%, in Greece 89%, in Bulgaria 69% and in Romania 57% of 
society think that reform is inevitable if their countries are to face the future.76 
In the candidate countries the majority of society still consider reform to be 
something positive.77 This sentiment is confirmed by voting patterns over the 
last five to six years, with politician being voted in for having a reform agenda. 
However, upon gaining power, they failed to implement these policies. 
Furthermore, the governments’ reaction to the crisis may impede future 
growth. The high level of general government debt make financing much 
needed investments in infrastructure significantly less possible. The lack of 
proper transport and energy infrastructure is one of the main problems of 
the region, undermining its competitiveness. The reform of public adminis-
tration and the restructuration and privatisation of public companies is also 
less possible as they would require lay-offs which, taking into account the 
increased level of unemployment, are rather impossible. In some countries 
the process of privatisation was even rather reversed. In Serbia for example 
Telecom and steel manufacturing conglomerate Zelezara Smederevo were 
renationalised. The economic crisis also widens the scope of the informal 
sector, which is constantly undermining both confidence in the rule of law 
and competitiveness. 
75 Ibid., p. 15. 
76 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_anx_en.pdf 
77 Ibid. 
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8. outlook
The countries in the Southeastern Europe have come out of the crisis with 
weak growth, high unemployment and with less determination to carry out 
reforms. The latter especially is worrying since the crisis highlighted the need 
for structural reforms to be carried out and a return to the pre-crisis model of 
growth is rather impossible. Given the unfavourable global climate for FDI, the 
return of a large influx of investment in the short term is rather impossible. Al-
though in 2015 growth is expected to be positive throughout the region (except 
Serbia), with the current significantly slower pace of economic development, 
convergence with the rest more developed economies in EU will be impossible. 
In the case of many of the region’s countries the global crisis had more pro-
found consequences than economic slowdown. It also influenced the quality 
of democracy in the region. It is especially visible in the countries on the EU’s 
doorstep, since it challenged the concept of transformation and development 
with EU membership as a main goal. The economic crisis undermined com-
mitment to EU enlargement and the willingness of member states to engage in 
the region and share limited resources will less developed countries. The EU 
has been dealing with its internal problems and has thus been paying less at-
tention to deteriorating democratic standards of democracy in the region and 
is not using its tools to push for the consolidation of reforms. 
The governing elite in the region lacking the perspective of EU membership on 
the horizon is keen on using non-democratic methods to stay in power. With 
a huge public sector and dwindling opportunities in the private sector, the gov-
ernment have more opportunities to control society. A high rate of unemploy-
ment makes the distribution of jobs in the public sector a powerful tool in gain-
ing supporters. It is nearly impossible for the political opposition to find work. 
The lack of sufficient financing of the press makes it more vulnerable to politi-
cal influence. Especially when we take into account that they are dependent on 
commercial financing by public enterprises, the administration or oligarchs 
close to government. 
In the economic recovery of Southeastern Europe, the EU’s role is crucial. It is 
rather impossible that the countries in the region will be able to catch up with 
advanced economies without help from the EU both financially and politically as 
the membership perspective is the main catalyst for reform, as the Central Eu-
ropean countries have proven. Commitment to EU enlargement is vital to ensure 
incentives for political elites to pursue the economic and institutional agenda. 
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Southeastern Europe countries to improve economic situation and speed up 
the process of catching up need to ease the burdens of the investment climate, 
to build infrastructure which ensures links within the region and to the EU 
and to strengthen institutions. These are the basic conditions for developing 
the current low-skilled economy with a lack of innovation and low investment 
in education and research and development. Detailed strategies are available 
in the document prepared by various international actors: Europe 2020 for 
Southeastern Europe prepared by the European Commission or the reports of 
the IMF or the EBRD. Looking at Central Europe’s transformation, though – 
evidence suggests that if countries are to accelerate reform in the region then 
broader support is badly needed: international actors like the EU and member 
countries, domestic leadership and societies have to work hand in hand. 
maRta szpala 
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III.  ByzantIum and pIpelInes: 
RussIa In tHe BalKans 
The Balkans are certainly not in first place on the list of Russian foreign policy 
priorities. Nevertheless, its location in Europe, the most important area of Rus-
sia’s economic and political activity in the world, the unfinished character of 
its integration with the EU and NATO, and serious economic and social prob-
lems in the Balkan EU member states (Greece) make the Balkans an attractive 
destination for Russian diplomats, spies and businessmen. Indeed, if we ex-
clude the post-Soviet space, Russia does not enjoy such large influence as it pos-
sesses in the Balkans in any other part of the world. The importance of Balkans 
in the Russian foreign policy agenda also derives from its role as a transit route 
for the Russian gas projects (currently Turkish Stream). The region’s European 
perspective and certain countries’ EU membership further increase even more 
the attractiveness the Balkans have for Russia, because Moscow’s engagement 
with these countries can be treated as an investment in the pro-Russian lobby 
in the EU (“Orthodox friends of Russia”). However, the most significant value 
of the region is the fact that Moscow treats the Balkans as a proxy playground 
in a wider geopolitical competition with the EU and the US. The Kremlin is 
ready to swap part of its assets in the Western Balkans for the Western conces-
sions in the post-Soviet space or the Middle East, namely for the West to recog-
nise the post-Soviet space as an exclusive Russian sphere of influence. 
1. from the slavia orthodoxa to the new Russia:  
Cultural and historical heritage 
The legacy of history, cultural heritage and the politics of memory constitute 
the main pillars of Russia’s influence in the Balkans. On the other hand, they 
also to a large degree shape Russia’s policy towards the region. The impact of 
these factors is often ignored or at least insufficiently recognised by the West-
ern actors focused on the present, the future and acquis communautaire. 
The Balkans occupy a very important place in Russia’s politics of memory, its 
cultural heritage and historical identity. The common Orthodox and Byzan-
tium heritage and (for most of the region’s inhabitants) Slavic ethnic back-
ground create the most important link between Russia and the Balkans. 
Orthodox Christianity arrived in Kievan Rus’ from the Byzantium Empire 
whose centre of gravity was located in the Balkans. Along with Christian-
ity the Church Slavonic language also arrived from the Balkans. In its Rus-
sian edition it remained the official language of Russia until the 18th century 
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and had a huge impact on Russian literary language. Church Slavonic was 
simply called Slavonic and constituted a basis for proto Pan-Slavism in Rus-
sia. After the fall of Constantinople Russia began to present itself as the sole 
successor of the Eastern Roman Empire (with the Tsar as autokrator, the 
double-headed eagle, the idea of the Third Rome, the legend of Monomakh’s 
cap – a symbol-crown) and a leader of the Orthodox and Slavic worlds. This 
self-perception was strengthen by many immigrants from the Balkans who 
played an important role in the development of Russian culture, its armed 
forces and diplomacy and Russia’s opening up to the West.78 Since the 18th 
century Russia strove to liberate the Balkans and Constantinople from 
“the Turkish yoke” in order to re-establish the Roman Empire (the so called 
“Greek Plan”). In the 19th century the Balkans gained a central place in the 
ideology of Pan-Slavism which admitted to Russia the role of protector and 
liberator of all Slavs. By default, between 1711 and 1918, Russia fought nine 
wars in the Balkans against the Ottoman Empire. These conflicts resulted 
in the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of independent 
countries in the Balkans. On the other hand, Russia’s expansion to the Bal-
kans created the rivalry with Austria-Hungary and Germany which ended 
up with the First World War (it was no accidental that it broke out in the 
Balkans) and the fall of Tsarist regime. In the 20th century communism be-
came another important instrument of Russia’s leverage in the region. In 
the interwar period Communist parties were popular in Bulgaria, Greece 
and Yugoslavia.79 The Balkan Communists occupied important places in the 
Soviet party structures or international communist organisations (Chrisi-
tan Rakovski, Georgi Dimitrov). During the Second World War, communist 
partisans supported by the Soviet Union played a key role in the resistance 
movement in the Balkans. At present, the legacy of the Second World War 
serves Russian interests because it is used to instigate anti-German preju-
dices in Greece and Serbia. On the other hand, after the Second World War 
the communist regimes in Yugoslavia and Albania defied the Soviet Russian 
predominance in the Communist movement, creating a serious challenge to 
the universalistic aspirations of the Kremlin. Last but not least, in the 20th 
century the Balkans become one of the most important arenas of the Cold 
War rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West. 
78 Important figures from the Balkans who substantially contributed to the development of 
Russia include inter alia: Metropolitan Cyprian, Theophanes the Greek, Maximus the Greek, 
Pantaleon Ligarid, Arsenius the Greek, Matija Zmajevic, Sava Vladislavich, Mikhail Milo-
radovich and Ioannis Kapodistrias. 
79 For instance, in 1920 Bulgarian communists won 20% of the vote in free and fair elections.
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In recent months the significance of the Balkans in the Russian historical nar-
rative increased decisively due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The 
historical concept of New Russia (Southern Ukraine) promoted by Moscow is 
strongly intertwined with the Balkans. New Russia was conquered by Russia 
at the end of 18th century within the framework of the expansion towards the 
Balkans. It was colonised inter alia by various ethnic groups from the Balkans 
including Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Gagauzians and Orthodox 
Albanians. They became to a very large degree Russified, accepting Russian na-
tional identity or Russian as their mother tongue. In effect, these communities 
symbolise the vision of Russia promoted by the Kremlin as an idealised multi-
ethnic empire, a sort of melting pot. Moreover, Crimea is particularly linked 
with the Balkans in the Russian historical memory because it is the most Byz-
antine part of former Tsarist Russia. The baptism of Vladimir the Great took 
place there. Therefore, Crimea possesses for Russia a status of deed conveyance 
of its property rights to the Imperial, Orthodox Christian and Kievan Rus’ tra-
ditions. Currently, the creation of a new myth of the Crimea can be observed in 
Russia. Taking into consideration Putin’s speeches and interviews, it can be as-
sumed that the Kremlin is using the myth of Kosovo as the Serbian Jerusalem 
and sacred cradle of Serbian statehood as a source of inspiration for the vision 
of Crimea as the Russian Mount Temple. It is not accidental, taking into ac-
count that Putin’s regime makes use in its propaganda of the dissolution of Yu-
goslavia as a dangerous lesson for today’s Russia. According to President Putin, 
the West aspires to destroy Russia as it did Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s independence 
is put in the same category as the annexation of Crimea but is also presented 
as one of the most serious Western challenges to Russia’s position in the world. 
A mythologised history makes the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians stand out in 
Europe in terms of positive attitudes towards Russia in Europe. The positive 
image of Russians as protectors or liberators is deeply entrenched in their his-
torical memories.80 Since the 16th century Russia has been perceived by Balkan 
Christians as a protector of the Orthodox Church. The financial and political 
support of Moscow increased gradually to the point when Russia in 1774 of-
ficially gained the status of the defender of Orthodox Balkan Christians’ in-
terests, which allowed her to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman 
Empire. Russia played a key role in how Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Roma-
nia and Serbia gained independence or autonomy. In the 19th century the huge 
Bulgarian and Greek communities living in in Tsarist Russia (particularly 
80 In the 18th century the legend about xanthos genos, a fair-haired powerful nation of liberators 
living in the North became very popular in Greek folklore. 
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Southern Ukraine) contributed considerably to their independence move-
ment and the modernisation of their countries.81 Meanwhile, Russia after Pe-
ter the Great’s reforms came to serve as a window to the West for immigrants 
from the Balkans.82 Indeed, Russians were substantially engaged in the mod-
ernisation of the Balkan nations in the 18-19th century (particularly Vojvodina 
in Serbia).83
On the other hand, the image of the historical Russian-Balkan relationship 
is idealised in the Balkans and Russia. The main problem is that in the past 
Russia relatively often treated its Balkan religious or ethnic “brothers” instru-
mentally. Moreover, a mutual feeling of superiority and negative prejudices – 
though weaker than the positive attitudes – exists between the Balkan nations 
and the Russians.84 The rivalry between the Balkan nations many times forced 
Russia to take sides and in consequence to alienate certain countries (Serbia 
and Greece vs. Bulgaria during the First World War).85 The Balkan societies of-
ten do not want to remember the difficult issues. It is also worth recalling that 
the Balkans are home to a huge Muslim community which perceives Russia’s 
historical legacy in the region in an unequivocally negative way.86
Russian politics of memory in action 
Last year’s hundredth anniversary of the breakout of World War I was ano-
ther opportunity for Putin to present a Russian version of history addres-
sed to the Balkans. According to Putin, Russia differed from the other great 
powers in not wanting this war, but it had to defend its brother Slavs, the 
81 The Greek uprising against the Ottomans was originally conceived by Greek immigrants in 
Odessa (Filiki Eteria or Society of Friends). 
82 In the 19th century in Odessa the main leaders of the Bulgarian national movement studied 
or worked: Ivan Vazov, Nayden Gerov, Hristo Botev or Stefan Stambolov. 
83 Relations between Serbs in Vojvodina and Russia resulted in an emergence of a new literary 
language in the middle of the 18th century, namely Slavonic Serbian. It was a mix of the 
Church Slavonic languages of Serbian and the Russian/Ruthenian version and vernacular 
Serbian and Russian. It was the official language in the autonomous Serbia until the 1860s. 
84 For instance, in the 15-17th century Russians perceived themselves as the only true Orthodox 
Christians which had never betrayed their faith, as opposed to the Greeks who at some point 
accepted unions with the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, the Balkan Orthodox 
Church elites described Russians quiet often as primitive uneducated barbarians. 
85 For instance, despite traditionally good Greek-Russian relations, in 1992 Russia was one of 
the first countries which recognized Macedonia’s independence under its constitutional 
name (the Republic of Macedonia). 
86 Due to demographic trends, the influence of the Muslim community in the Balkans will in-
crease even more in coming years. 
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Serbs, who were under attack from Austria-Hungary. Consequently Russia 
waged a just war and not an imperialist one like Vienna or Berlin. In re-
sponse Belgrade, within the hundredth anniversary of Russia’s and Serbia’s 
joint struggle, started construction of a monument to Tsar Nicholas II. At 
the end of October 2014, on the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Belgra-
de by the Red Army and Tito’s partisans, the Serbian government organi-
sed a great parade in the capital, inviting Putin despite the objections of the 
EU. It was the first military parade in Serbia for almost 30 years. Putin is 
the only foreign leader who has received the highest Serbian official award. 
Serbian President Nikolic, who became famous due to his declaration that 
“there is only one thing [he] loves more than Serbia, namely Russia”, said to 
Putin when pinning the medal to his breast: “Please wear this as an expres-
sion of gratitude for everything that you and your nation did and are still 
doing so that Serbia could preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity 
in freedom and peace and to achieve progress in every sphere of life”. Du-
ring the parade President Nikolic continued in the same lofty spirit: “Your 
participation is an honour for us, the symbol of our common great past, 
present and future. [...] The Russian necropolis (of soldiers killed in battle) 
in the New Cemetery in Belgrade is a sacred place for every inhabitant of 
the capital of Serbia, it is an expression of the eternal gratitude of the in-
habitants of my country for every private, non-commissioned officer, and 
officer of the Russian army, who will remain forever in Serbia, for which 
he heroically gave his life.” Putin responded in kind, declaring that “Russia 
and Serbia are united by a stable and continuous bond of brotherhood and 
friendship, which always was, is and will be the pride of our countries and 
nations”. Tens of thousands of Serbians listened to his speech, interrupted 
with shouts of “Putin, Putin” and “Russia, Russia”. 
source: www.b92.net
2. from Russia with love: Russian soft power 
The impact of history is so strong that Russia does not need to spend big money 
on development aid and scholarships for students from the Balkan countries. 
In fact, the funds allocated by Moscow for these purposes are often ridiculous-
ly small. The myth of a friendly and caring Russia is stronger, and knowledge 
about the real Russia is weaker. Very few tourists from Balkan countries visit 
Russia. Few people in Serbia or Greece know Russian, though the situation is 
different in Bulgaria. The most fascinating phenomenon is how the virtual im-
age of Russia is reality-resistant in Balkan societies. For instance, opinion polls 
conducted in Serbia show that almost half of the Serbian population believe 
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Russia to be the main donor of development aid for their country. In fact, the 
Russian ODA is negligible in comparison to the financial support provided by 
the EU. Moscow pursues a successful propaganda campaign reinforcing the 
mythical positive image of Russia. Russian organisation Russkiy Mir (Russian 
World) and the International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Nations 
opened their offices in the Balkans. Russian foundations supporting local ex-
treme right and Eurosceptic organisations are alsoactive in the region. There 
are also Serbian, Greek and Bulgarian language versions of Russian websites, 
hawking the Kremlin’s version of events. The Russian Orthodox Church is 
a very important instrument of Russia’s influence in the Balkans, with it often 
playing the role of the “Older Brother” for the local churches.
In consequence of all these factors, Russia enjoys an impressive high level of 
sympathy among Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks. According to opinion polls, 
the Serbs, particularly in Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are 
the most pro-Russian nation in Europe outside the post-Soviet space. Sym-
pathy towards Russia is just slightly weaker in Greece. Greek society, be-
sides Cyprus, has the most positive approach towards Russia in the EU. As 
far as a positive attitude to Russia is concerned, the Bulgarians end up with 
the third place on the podium. All the above mentioned nations – though to 
varying degrees – are against sanctions against Russia. Sympathy for Rus-
sia in Greece and especially in Serbia is combined with an antipathy for the 
US, which in the context of its confrontation with the West is for Moscow 
an excellent opportunity to reinforce its influence among ordinary people. 
Bulgarian sympathy towards Russia – as opposed to Greece and Serbia – is 
not accompanied by strong anti-Americanism. Bulgaria and Greece perceive 
the EU as the main centre of gravity for themselves. However, the number of 
supporters of a pivot towards Russia is relatively high in these countries. Ser-
bia is a particularly valuable partner for Russia because Serbian society is the 
most pro-Russian and simultaneously anti-American and staunchly rejects 
accession to NATO since the NATO air strikes in 1999. Moreover Russia is 
perceived by Serbs as a more preferable partner than the EU.87 Nevertheless, 
in Greece and Bulgaria and even in Serbia substantial minorities have a nega-
tive opinion of Russia. The criticism increased in recent months because of 
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
87 It is not an accident that Serbs make up the largest group of volunteers fighting on the sepa-
ratist side in Donbas. However, their number is generally negligible.
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opinion polls on Russia 
greece
According to the Transatlantic Trends 2014 survey conducted in June 2014, 
more than half of Greeks declared support for Russia’s strong leadership 
in world affairs and 40% of Greeks were against it. It was definitely the hi-
ghest level of support within the EU among the nations polled. By compa-
rison, only 30% of Greek supported a strong US leadership in world affairs, 
and 65% were against it. 65% of Greeks have a positive opinion of Russia 
and 35% negative. Again, Greece with a strong sympathy to Russia and its 
interests was a unique case among the nations polled. Only 35% supported 
stronger economic sanctions against Russia and over 60% were against. In 
fact in recent months approval of sanctions in Greece decreased further.88
Bulgaria
In the survey conducted by Alpha Research on the demands of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations at the turn of February and March 2015, the posi-
tive attitude towards Russia after the annexation of the Crimea remained un-
changed at 54% of Bulgarians with 7% claiming that they support Russia more 
today than before the annexation. Almost 10% state that they had a negative 
attitude towards Russia before the conflict and another 30% declared that they 
sympathise currently less with Russia than last year due to the Russian ag-
gression against Ukraine. The majority of Bulgarians (over 60%) do not sup-
port the imposition of severe sanctions against Russia if it violates the ceasefire 
agreement in Ukraine as opposed to almost 40% who would support them. In 
a hypothetical referendum, more than 60% would vote “yes” for the conserva-
tion of the orientation towards NATO and the EU and one third would vote 
“yes” for a shift towards Russia and the Eurasian Union.89
serbia and Republika srpska
According to the opinion poll conducted by IPSOS in May 2014 in Republika 
Srpska 66% of respondents supported the opinion that Republika Srpska 
88 GMF, Transatlantic Trends 2014, http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2012/09/Trends_2014_
ToplineData.pdf
89 Public Opinion Poll: Bulgarian foreign policy, the Russia-Ukraine conflict and national se-
curity 26th March 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/public_opinion_poll311520
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should align itself with Russia even if the EU and the US opposed this (only 
13% had a different position on this issue). 39% of the citizens of Republi-
ka Srpska supported EU accession on condition that RS would retain bro-
ad autonomy, and 38% were against. Support for accession dropped below 
15% and opposition rose to almost 60% in the case of the implementation of 
constitutional reforms required by the EU which foresee a limitation of the 
autonomy. The overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs rejected Bosnia’s 
accession to NATO.90
According to the opinion poll conducted in April 2015 by the journal Nova 
Srpska Politicka Misao91, more than 60% of respondents in Serbia suppor-
ted an alliance with Russia (less than 20% were against) and more 40% sup-
ported Serbia’s accession to the EU (almost 40% were against). The support 
for the accession to the EU decreased from above 55% in November 2014.
80% of Serbs were against NATO membership (less than 10% were in favo-
ur). Above 45% of Serbs were supportive of an equally strong cooperation 
with the EU and Russia. Almost 30% of Serbians see Russia as the most im-
portant partner in foreign policy, while the EU is seen this way by less than 
15% of Serbian society.
3. an economic playmaker?
Russia is an important economic partner of the Balkan countries, but it stands 
no chance of replacing the EU in its role as a focus of attraction for the economies 
of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Moreover, Russia’s position is weaker than that 
of some of EU members, for example Germany and Italy. Russia’s aspirations to 
strengthen its economic influence are increasingly being relegated to the sphere 
of wishful thinking. The geopolitical confrontation with the West and the eco-
nomic crisis in Russia led Moscow to abandon the project of building the South 
Stream gas pipeline through the Black Sea and the Balkans in late 2014. When he 
announced his decision during his visit to Turkey in December 2014, Putin had 
not even bothered to warn the Balkan countries beforehand. On the other hand 
90 U. Vukic, Istrazivanje: Podrska Rusiji bez obzira na posljedice, 10.06.2014, Nezavisne Novine, 
http://www.nezavisne.com/novosti/bih/Istrazivanje-Podrska-Rusiji-bez-obzira-na-
posljedice-248780
91 NSPM, Srbija – zima 2014/15 (sa komentarom Đorđa Vukadinovića),1.01. 2015,  http://www.
nspm.rs/istrazivanja-javnog-mnjenja/srbija-%E2%80%93-zima-2014/15-sa-komentarom-
djordja-vukadinovica.html
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Putin presented another great gas project, assuming the construction of a pipe-
line across the Black Sea to Turkey and then of a gas hub on the Turkish-Greek 
border. Putin did not explain how a belt-tightening Russia would find the huge 
funds for the project and in what way and whom he will involve in the EU. This 
project is even more of a “pipe dream” than South Stream. It can be treated as 
a Potemkin village in the energy area. Failure to implement the Turkish Stream 
project would be a serious blow to Russia’s standing in the region. For Greece or 
Serbia, the attractiveness of cooperation with Russia is based on expectations of 
benefits stemming from future transit tariffs, investment in the energy sector 
(capital inflow), construction projects (employment) and cheaper gas prices. 
In spite of these obvious weaknesses of Russia, its economic influence in the re-
gion should not be ignored, especially in the energy sector. Russia is one of the 
top trade partners of the Balkan countries. In 2014 Russia’s share in Greece’s, 
Bulgaria’s and Serbia’s total trade approached 10% and in Republika Srpska it 
was as high as 15%. Russia is an important importer to Bulgaria, Greece and 
Serbia (10-15%), it sells mostly raw materials, especially natural gas. The share 
of natural gas in the total consumption of energy in Bulgaria, Greece and Ser-
bia is not high. It varies from around 12% to 15%. However, the share of Russian 
gas in the consumption of gas in Bulgaria and Serbia oscillates between 85-90% 
and in Greece it is over 50%. 
In contrast, the importance of the Russian market for exports from Bulgaria 
or Greece is limited (1.5-2.5%). The situation is better in the case of Serbia, with 
which Russia has signed a free trade agreement. Its exports to Russia were 
around 7% in 2014. Belgrade hopes that by not participating in the sanctions 
it will increase exports to Russia, but last year they stagnated and this year, 
because of the crisis in Russia, they will probably start to decline.
As recently as a few years ago Bulgaria and Greece hoped that Russian tourists – 
oligarchs and the middle-class – would become a driver of development for the 
tourist sector in the light of the crisis in the Eurozone. Rich Russians also bought 
a lot of houses on the Bulgarian coast and on the Greek islands. But the economic 
crisis in Russia is turning the vision of a deluge of Russian tourists flooding the 
beaches in Varna or on Rhodes into a pipe dream. Russians accounted for slight-
ly more than 7% of all foreign tourists in Bulgaria (fifth place) and above 5% in 
Greece (sixth place). Their share in receipts in Greece exceeded 9% (third place).92 
92 Dimitrios Journeys, 2014 Greek Tourism statistics – more than 24.2 million tourists in Greece 
in 2014, http://buhalis.blogspot.com/2015/04/2014-greek-tourism-statistics-more-than.htm
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However, due to the economic crisis in Russia the share of Russians in arrivals 
of foreign tourists fell back in 2014, particularly in Greece. In the coming years 
their number will probably decline further rather than increase.
Russia is a relatively important investor in Bulgaria and Serbia (about 5% of 
all direct investment). It is worth remembering that in both countries there 
are also large investments registered in Cyprus, quite often really originating 
in Russia. The Cyprus connection also plays an important role in the case of 
Greece, its economy being tightly connected with Cyprus. Russian investments 
in the Balkans are targeted mostly at the energy sector which, like in Russia, 
is interwoven with politics. For example, Gazprom is the owner of the private 
energy company Naftna Industrija Srbije, the largest corporation in Serbia. 
Belgrade sold it at a much reduced price to Gazprom as a gift for Moscow’s sup-
port on the international stage in the context of Kosovo.
Russian companies are interested in investments in the Greek energy sector 
and infrastructure facilities (port of Thessaloniki, railways). Despite the mu-
tual interest in cooperation, Moscow and Athens are still unable to agree on 
the terms and conditions. In 2013, Gazprom was close to the acquisition of con-
trolling stakes in the main Greek state-owned gas company DEPA, but the deal 
fell through at the last moment due to the reluctance of the Greek side to accept 
Russian control of the company.
Russia has established even more striking links between politics and energy in 
the Republika Srpska in Bosnia. It is in this country that Moscow has by far its 
greatest economic influence in the Balkans. Russia is unrivalled there as a very 
important investor and the second most important trade partner (almost exclu-
sively Russian imports). The oil refinery in Bosanski Brod controlled by Russian 
capital plays akey role in Republika Srpska’s economy. The market of Republika 
Srpska has very small economic importance, but is highly significant politically 
and it is no coincidence that Russia has such a strong presence there. 
4. geopolitical chess 
Russia treats the Balkans as an arena of its great game with the West, encompass-
ing also the post-Soviet area and the Middle East. On the other hand, Republika 
Srpska, Serbia and Greece treat cooperation with Russia as leverage on the inter-
national and European arena and particularly in the region in dealings with ri-
vals. It is easiest for Russia to influence the countries waiting in line for EU mem-
bership – Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia. In both countries all the major 
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political parties support close cooperation with Moscow. Indeed, in no other part 
of the Balkans can Russia count on such high support from the political elite as in 
Republika Srpska in Bosnia. After the annexation of the Crimea, the president of 
RS, Milorad Dodik waxed lyrical about Putin and said that Russia’s actions should 
be a model for his country to follow: Republika Srpska should announce a refer-
endum and unite with Serbia. Bosnia is a very loose federation, and support from 
Republika Srpska is a necessary condition for making any important decisions 
regarding the whole country. Bosnia, just like Serbia, in March 2014 abstained 
from voting in the UN General Assembly when a resolution condemning the ag-
gression of Russia in Ukraine was adopted.
Bosnia a highly corrupt and inefficient failing state is the most serious chal-
lenge to the West in the Balkans. One important challenge to the country’s 
transformation is the fact that reforms are blocked by RS, which has very wide 
veto rights and can count on hard-line support from Russia. The aim of RS is to 
prove that Bosnia is a failing state with no future and consequently to lead to its 
breakup. Unfortunately, within the West there is no consensus about resolving 
this Gordian knot. Russia has significant influence on the future of Bosnia as 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In November 2014, Russia 
abstained from voting in the Security Council on the matter of extending the 
EU mission in Bosnia. By doing so it sent a clear signal to the West that it is ca-
pable of hampering its progress in this country. Russia justified its position by 
claiming that the resolution concerning that issue supported the accession of 
Bosnia to the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, Moscow does not support the NATO 
bid of Bosnia using as a pretext the fact that the majority of Bosnian Serbs, con-
stituting around 30% of Bosnia’s population reject NATO membership. 
No major politician in Serbia has dared to follow Dodik in his unconditional 
support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But Moscow could count on Bel-
grade during the vote in the UN General Assembly in March 2014. The position 
of Serbia was reciprocal for Russia’s support of Serbia on the international are-
na in the context of the independence of Kosovo, which Belgrade still regards 
as its own province. On the other hand, Russian position is very inconsistent. 
In recent years Moscow has radically undermined the principle of territorial 
integrity in Georgia and in Ukraine. From the point of view of Brussels, the fact 
that Serbia has not joined the EU sanctions against Moscow is even more prob-
lematic. The close cooperation between Russia and Serbia (visa-free travel, 
a free trade agreement and cooperation in the energy sector) constitutes a seri-
ous challenge to Serbia’s EU bid. In all these fields, Serbia will have to adapt to 
EU law and hence come into conflict with Moscow.
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From the Russian perspective one great asset of Serbia is its lack of interest in 
NATO membership, making it an exceptional case in the Balkans and Central 
Europe. Moreover, Serbia is working closely with Russia in the military sphere 
(the 2013 agreement). Already in 2011, a Regional Humanitarian Centre, where 
Russian engineers are stationed, was established in Serbia. Regular Russian-
Serbian military drills take place there. Serbia became the only country from 
outside the former Soviet Union Serbia to join the Russian-led Collective Se-
curity Treaty Organization as an observer. However, the military cooperation 
between Serbia and NATO is definitely more advanced than that between Ser-
bia and Moscow.
In the case of Athens, the main geopolitical consideration behind Greece’s coop-
eration with Russia is a balancing act between Turkey and the EU. Support for 
close cooperation with Russia enjoys almost absolute approval across all parties 
of the political spectrum. For instance, Greek-Russian relations flourished un-
der Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis from the centre-right New Democracy, 
who was in office from 2004 to 2009. Karamanlis held far more meetings with 
Putin than he had with American leaders. He cooperated closely with the Rus-
sians on major energy projects, such as the Burgas-Alexandroupolis and South 
Stream pipelines. However, the recently established government composed of 
the far left Syriza and nationalistic Independent Greeks distinguishes itself 
particularly by its pro-Russian stance.93 The ministries regularly refer to Rus-
sia as a “Plan B” an alternative to the EU in their fight against the economic cri-
sis. In spring 2014 Alexis Tsipras voiced support for the Crimean “referendum” 
that paved the way for the annexation. He said that the EU “is shooting itself in 
the foot” by imposing sanctions. According to Tsipras, Ukraine’s pro-EU gov-
ernment contains “neo-Nazis”. Currently, Tsipras is among the few EU lead-
ers supporting the Turkish Stream project. Certain officials from Syriza and 
politicians of the Independent Greeks have even stronger ties to the Russian 
elite than Tsipras. Defence Minister Panos Kammenos and Foreign Minister 
Nikos Kotzias have documented ties to Alexander Dugin, a Russian Eurasianist 
and academic close to Putin. Since 1991 Greece has been the NATO member to 
cooperate most closely with Russia in the field of hard security. In 1995 the 
countries signed an intergovernmental agreement on the military coopera-
tion. Between 1998 and 2005 Greece acquired over one billion USD worth of 
93 Syriza policy towards Russia is inspired by the PASOK government which, under the Social-
ist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, in the 1980s vigorously pursued rapprochement 
with the Soviet Union as a way to put pressure on Turkey and because of ideological and pop-
ulist considerations (Anti-Americanism).
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Russian weapons. In that period Russia was the third most important supplier 
of military equipment to Greece (almost 15% of total military export). After 
2005 and before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Greece held several 
naval and air exercises with Russian armed forces. 
The foreign policy of Bulgaria is definitely less pro-Russian than the policy con-
ducted by Republika Srpska, Serbia or Greece. This state of affairs stems from 
the more diverse position of the Bulgarian parties on Russia and feeble anti-
Americanism in the Bulgarian political elite. GERB, a centre-right party – and 
the most popular political force in recent years– has generally a realistic and 
pragmatic approach towards Russia. Smaller centre-right parties, for instance 
the Reformist Bloc, are critical towards Russia. The Russian lobby is composed 
of post-Communist parties: the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Alternative for 
Bulgarian Revival and the far-right Ataka. Russia can also influence negatively 
on developments on the political scene by using certain Bulgarian oligarchs 
involved in business with Russia or intelligence networks originating from the 
communist period when the Bulgarian security sector was the most closely in-
tegrated with the KGB in the Soviet sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Russian 
leverage in Bulgaria depends mostly on the make-up of the government. Af-
ter the elections in November 2014 a new government was established around 
GERB with strong representation from the Reformist Bloc. Rosen Plevneliev, 
the president of Bulgaria, is one of the most popular politicians in the country 
and he presents an ambivalently pro-Western position. It is no accident that 
when Putin announced the decision to abandon the South Stream project dur-
ing his visit to Turkey, he blamed the failure of the project on Bulgaria. In his 
view Bulgaria had not behaved as a sovereign state and had succumbed to pres-
sure from Brussels contrary to its own interests. 
5. Conclusions
In the long term perspective, there is no credible alternative to EU member-
ship for the Balkans. However, the EU cannot rest on its laurels. The influence 
of Russia in the Balkans has substantially risen in recent years. Moreover, 
Russia’s leverage is deeply rooted in history and culture and, by default, it is 
often irrational and very difficult to challenge. At the same time, the EU’s lev-
erage in the region is hazy. There is no stakeholder (such as Germany in the 
case of Central Europe) that would push integration in the region forward. As 
a consequence, the EU’s attraction in the short and medium term perspective 
can be contested by Moscow in certain Balkan countries. Currently, the  so-
called “Greek pivot to Russia” is mostly just posturing or soft Greek blackmail 
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directed towards the EU. Its aim is to increase Greece’s leverage in dealing with 
Brussels and Berlin. Taking into consideration the creeping economic crisis 
in Russia, the Kremlin’s ability to “save” Greece is very limited. It was very 
symptomatic that during Tsipras’s last visit to Moscow in April 2015 Greece 
was not offered any form of financial aid for its struggling economy.94 In con-
sequence, despite its pro-Russian rhetoric, in summer 2015 Greece will most 
probably  stick to the  EU’s common position on sanctions against Russia if it 
has any hope of  emerging from  the economic crisis. However, the failure of 
negotiations between the EU and Greece concerning the economic reforms or 
the Grexit (the Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone) should not be excluded 
either. It could result in a very serious crisis in Athens’ relations with Brussels 
and Berlin. Certainly, this crisis would be exploited by Russia which would try 
to exert the tactics of “divide and conquer” against the EU. 
The best antidote to Russian interference in the Balkans is EU membership 
for the all countries of the region. Although Russia enjoys large sympathy 
in Greek society, Greece has endorsed – if unwillingly – the EU sanctions. 
The most important issue in the region is to make the continued process of 
Serbia’s integration with the EU dependent on Belgrade’s unequivocal sup-
port for EU policy towards Republika Srpska in Bosnia. It would be a rep-
etition of the EU stance towards Croatia before its accession. Unfortunately, 
the reliability of EU pressure depends on the plausibility of the membership 
prospects, and these, given the rise of Eurosceptic forces in the EU and en-
largement fatigue, may become increasingly distant. (Unfortunately, the re-
liability of EU pressure depends on the plausibility of membership prospects 
and these, given the rise of Eurosceptic forces in the EU and enlargement fa-
tigue, may become increasingly distant.) In fact, the most recent increase of 
Euroscepticism in Serbia is to a certain degree in response to these negative 
trends in the EU. Another precondition for the success of the conditionality 
placed on Serbia has to be for the EU’s main players to take a common stance 
on the future of Bosnia. 
adam BalCeR 
94 Instead, Tsipras returned to Greece with only a general joint action plan to increase cooper-
ation in trade, tourism and energy, including discussion of a possible deal with Gazprom on 
Turkish Stream.
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